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Abstract
Between the 1950s and 1960s, a comprehensive development plan existed concerning the Lower 
Mekong River Basin. Questions revolved around who devised what concept for the development 
of the Lower Mekong River, and how these concepts were implemented. In this article, we first 
analyzed the processes leading to Japan’s participation in the comprehensive development plan. 
Next, as part of the tributary development plan for this initiative, we analyzed the processes of 
the formation and subsequent development of the catchment area’s development plan for the 
Kingdom of Cambodia’s Prek Thnot River by multilateral development assistance as led by Japan. 
The development of the Prek Thnot River Power and Irrigation Project stopped as a result of the 
1970 Cambodian Civil War and remains incomplete. Therefore, we analyzed the planning potential 
of the Prek Thnot River’s development plan from current viewpoints. What is made clear from 
the analyses is that both the basic philosophy and design philosophy behind the Mekong River 
Basin’s development initiative is relevant to today, and the development should not be conducted 
as a domestic matter, but should be conducted in continuation of its conceptual framework of 
international significance, as it concerns the suburb countries of the Mekong River.
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1. Introduction
　　　In the post-WWII era, the Lower Mekong River Development was not only a consequence of 
the attempts by major Japanese construction companies and engineers to tap into a new market, 
but also proof of the cooperative spirit that the Japanese engineers tried to show toward their 
neighboring countries in Asia. Yet how did Japan conceptualize the development of the Lower 
Mekong River, and how was it carried out? By examining the evolution of foreign (including 
Japanese) commitment to the creation of the comprehensive development plan for the Mekong 
River Basin in the first half of this article, we shed light on the Prek Thnot River Power and 
Irrigation Project in Cambodia (hereinafter the Prek Thnot Project) in the latter half. 
　　　The Prek Thnot Project was the hallmark of Japan’s involvement in the Mekong River Basin 
project in the 1950s and 1960s (which involved a development plan using multilateral development 
assistance), with Japan taking initiative as the largest donor country. As the initiators of the 
construction work, the Japanese companies’ evaluated the feasibility and then began the work. Yet 
the project was indefinitely suspended because of the Cambodian Civil War in the 1970s. After the 
conflict ended in the 1990s, a revitalization of the project was proposed several times, but was not 
completed until today. 
　　　While our forthcoming article focuses on the diplomatic interactions and negotiations on the 
Prek Thnot Project in conjunction with the dynamics of the regional and global politics during 
the Cold War, this article consists of our examination of how the Japanese engineers designed 
a development plan in the related region, and how they struggled to implement it. Sections two 
and three describe the geographical contour of the Mekong River Basin and its use under French 
colonial rule. Section four discusses the initial international attempts to explore the potential 
demand and growth in the Lower Mekong River after the Second World War. Section five and 
six examine the Japanese engineers’ role through the evolutionary process of the Lower Mekong 
River’s development concept. Sections seven to nine consider how the Prek Thnot Project, as a 
tributary development, was incorporated into the entire development concept of the Mekong River 
Basin. The final section assesses the achievements of the Prek Thnot Project and considers the 
challenges for Japan in using this historical legacy as an asset to reinvigorate its commitment to 
the related regions. 
2. Geographical Features of the Mekong River Basin
　　　The Mekong River flows from the Tibetan Plateau through to Yunnan Province, passes 
through the continental part of Southeast Asia, and feeds into the South China Sea. According 
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to the most recent estimation by the Mekong River Commission, the River is 810,000 square 
kilometers and has a total length of 4,763 kilometers. The Mekong River is usually divided between 
its upstream and downstream regions near to Chang Sen, and changes from the Myanmar/Laos 
border to the Thai/Laos border1. Its upstream basin countries border China and Myanmar, and its 
downstream catchment area borders Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 
　　　The upstream area consists of 189,000 square kilometers, which is 23.8% of the total 
catchment area. It conveys 80 billion cubic meters of water, which is equivalent to 18.2% of the 
annual runoff of the entire basin (450 billion cubic meters), with roughly 16% from China and 2% 
from Myanmar. Considering the size of the catchment area, the downstream area is larger and 
thus more widely affects the adjacent land areas. Approximately 370 billion cubic meters flow 
out from the downstream area, accounting for 82% (roughly 35% from Laos, 18% from Thailand, 
18% from Cambodia, and 11% from Vietnam). Locally-measured data suggests that 93% of the 
average annual runoff in the Mekong River Basin is concentrated in Kratie Province in Cambodian 
territory (with a basin area of 646,000 square kilometers and a distance of 545 kilometers from the 
estuary)2. Kratie Province is in the Mekong Delta, and starts from Kampong Cham whose summit 
is near to Phnom Penh. It is a huge delta with an area of 49,520 square kilometers (of which 26% 
is in Cambodia and 74% is in Vietnam). There is little inclination, and the River channel branches 
to form several lines. The River rises from September to November, and in the rainy season 
water overflows from the riverbanks resulting in the flooding of vast areas (about 10,000 square 
kilometers). Once the river floods, inundated areas sometimes reach to 30,000 square kilometers3.
　　　Since ancient times, the Mekong River Basin has consisted of a mainstream and innumerous 
tributaries and connected the north and south regions. The basin constituted vast and intricate 
networks for migration, with various ethnic groups or tribes such as Khmer, Champa(Chăim), Lao, 
Kinh, and Tai moving freely and both flowing in from all directions including India and China, 
and out to other directions. Traditionally in the Mekong Delta (including the Cambodian region), 
an indigenous irrigation system known as Tum Nub was developed. In the ninth century, the 
ancient Cambodian dynasty’s Khmer Emperors started to construct a broad irrigation system. 
However, Thai and Champa leaders obstructed the completion of the works. Despite sporadic 
local skirmishes, the Khmer and Champa leaders made an effort to develop the Mekong Delta by 
constructing a maze of canals. 
1 Takashi Kawai, “Mekon Gawa Sogo Kaihatsu no Doko, Zantei Mekong Iinkai no Doko” (Direction of Mekong 
Basin Development-Aspect of Interim Mekong Committee during 15 Years 1978-92). Nettai Nogyo 37(3), 1993, 
pp.241-242. 
2 JICA, Mekongawa No Kaihatsu: Mekong Iinkai ga Sasaerumono (Tokyo: JICA Kenshusho [Training Center], 
1990), p.5
3 Takaya Yoshikazu, “A Physiographic Classification of Rice Land in the Mekong Delta”, Tounan Asia Kenkyu  
[Southeast Asian Studies] 12(2), 1974, pp.135-142.
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3. French Colonial Rule and the River’s Resource Development
　　　The nineteenth century saw modern water resource engineering introduced into the Mekong 
River Basin for the first time. Following the establishment of its colonial rule in the so-called 
“Indochina” region, France dispatched an expedition team of six men under Naval Commander 
Doudart de Lagree to explore the Mekong River in 1866. France intended to assess the potential 
of the Mekong River as a commercial waterway which would connect their colonies with China’s 
hinterland. After leaving Saigon, the team began journeying upstream in the Mekong River. 
However, they found their way blocked by the raging streams in Sumbour, the Khone Waterfall, 
and Kemarath in Cambodia, and were forced to quit. This is the first recorded organizational 
attempt to investigate the Mekong River4. 
　　　The famous French naturalist, Henry Mouhot, traveled around the Indochina peninsula 
between 1858 and 1860 and depicted Cambodia as less developed compared to its neighboring areas 
such as Siam (Thailand) and Vietnam. With arrogance and impudence, Mouhot candidly stated 
that he was “disappointed,” and that “Almost every vice seemed prevalent at Kompt [Cambodian 
city]; pride, insolence, cheating, cowardice, servility, and excessive idleness are the attributes of 
this miserable people5.” He shared sentiments of mercantilism and imperialism as observable 
in nineteenth century Europe, and he found a great opportunity in this untapped land. Pointing 
out the unfavorable possibility of economic turbulence and the resultant rise in unemployment 
in France that could be caused by the suspension of the import of American products due to the 
outbreak of the Civil War, Mouhot found an alternative economic value in Cambodia. He exclaimed, 
“What a vast field might be opened on the banks of the Mekong and of Tonle Sap for European 
activity, industry, and capital!”6 
　　　After being concerned with economic rivalry with England, he warned that if England made 
Cambodia “a vast cotton plantation,” then the French should “be compelled to buy from her7.” 
Mouhot noticed that the mountains in Cambodia contained “gold, argentiferous lead, zinc, copper, 
and iron,” and openly stated that “I wish her [France] to possess this land8.” 
　　　Consistent with the imperialist motives upon incorporating Cambodia into the French 
Indochina protectorate in 1863 and becoming the de-facto rule around 1866, the French governors 
struggled to extend the ancient canal system. France more explicitly showed an interest in the 
application of modern water engineering to the affected areas as it became more involved in the 
4 Milton Osborne, River Road to China: The Search for the Source of the Mekong, Atlantic Monthly Press; 1st 
American Ed edition ,1999．Page unknown.
5 Henri Mouhot, Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China(Siam), Cambodia, and Laos: During the Years 
1858, 1859, and 1860, (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1864) p.180.
6 Mouhot, p.276.
7 Ibid., p.276.
8 Mouhot, p.275.
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development of the Mekong River Basin, and established the first water level observation station in 
Vientiane, Laos in 1895 and later added rainfall observatories at 140 locations across the Mekong 
River Basin. The French colonial regime also designed the Dong Cam Dam in Vietnam in 1917, 
beginning construction in 1924 and finishing in 1932. 
　　　As a result of such endeavors, France deployed a broad meteorological and hydrological 
observation network along the Mekong River. Throughout the network, France created a huge 
volume of meteorological and hydrological documents which are still considered to be the bases for 
the planning of the development of the watershed today. Meanwhile, France formed the foundations 
for colonial management by the late nineteenth century by dredging a canal in the Mekong 
Delta, developing water channel networks to cultivate local farmland, constructing railroads and 
detours to circumvent waterfalls, developing Phnom Penh port, and developing rubber and coffee 
plantations.
4. Attempts to Elaborate Upon the Water Resource Development Plan by ECAFE, the USA, and the 
Mekong Committee
　　　The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (March 13–May 7, 1954) shocked the US. When 
questioned about the strategic importance of Indochina for “the free world” at a press conference 
on April 7, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower replied as follows:
　　　First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that 
the world needs. Then, you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a 
dictatorship that is inimical to the free world. Finally, you have broader considerations that 
might follow what you would call the “falling domino” principle. You have a row of dominoes 
set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that 
it will go over very quickly. Thus, you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would 
have the most profound influences. Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from 
this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. These are very important. There 
are others, of course; the rubber plantations and so on. Then, with respect to more people 
passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples 
to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.9
　　　Against the backdrop of Washington’s growing concern over communist threats and regional 
9 Public Paper of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, pp.381-390.
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instability in the Mekong River Basin, the US began wielding its influence over the development 
policy of international organs such as Asian Development Bank, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and Mekong Committee as referred later). Under 
the US’s leadership, two important reports were published concerning water resource development. 
The first was the Preliminary Report on Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water 
Resource Development of the Mekong: An International River,  published by the Bureau of Flood 
Control at the ECAFE in 195210. This report was the result of a preliminary study conducted by this 
Bureau, and turned out to be the very first report on the Mekong River’s development in the post-
WWII era. The other was the International Cooperation Administration’s (ICA) Reconnaissance 
Report on Lower Mekong River Basin (1956), which reflected the results of a one-year survey 
conducted by the Bureau of Reclamation at the US Department of the Interior11. The report took 
the form of a full-scale Mekong River Basin Development Plan. Pursuant to this plan, the ICA, 
formulated as an independent organ under the US State Department, called for Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, and south Vietnam to cooperate with the US. In the early years post-WWII, the US was 
interested in the development of the Mekong River for the strategic reason of countering the threat 
of communist aggressiveness by exporting the Tennessee Valley Development Corporation (TVA) 
model signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
　　　Hiroshi Hori, a river engineer and former technical officer in the Japanese government, was 
deeply involved in the international aid program for the development of the Mekong River Basin, 
and commented on the above-mentioned reports as follows:
　　　The ECAFE [1952] and US [1956] reports progressed beyond the standard of the previous 
French River improvement plan, as the latter was narrowly designed for single purposes 
such as ship transportation and flood control. In brief, [the more recent of the two reports 
suggest that] by collecting reliable and extensive fundamental data in the beginning, the 
related countries through which the Mekong River flow should draw a plan for the effective 
use of land and water resources to improve the living standards of the inhabitants in the 
whole downstream area. These countries should implement these schemes en masse with 
a shared comprehensive and well-balanced concept of watershed development. The ECAFE 
and US reports were eye-opening for policymakers in the field of the downstream area’s 
development.12
10 ECAFE, Preliminary Report on Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water Resources 
Development of the Mekong: An International River,  Flood/8/Review1, 1952.
11 USA-Bureau of Reclamation, ICA Reconnaissance Report on Lower Mekong River Basin,  Washington: 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1956.
12 Hiroshi Hori, Mekong gawa kaihatsu to kankyou, Kokinsyoin, 1996: p.89.
－ 57 －
　　　Based on the preliminary report in 1952, ECAFE launched a fully-fledged investigation in 
1956 and published another report (The Development of Water Resources in the Mekong River 
Basin)  in the next year13. With ample data for rainfall, flow rate, and topography, the report 
calculated the potential for water resource development in the Lower Mekong River areas. The 
data set included the future demand for hydropower, ship transportation, irrigation, and flood 
control. Based on the results, the report recommended the development of dams at six Mekong 
River streams: Luang Blanc, Pamon, Takeku, Kemarath, Korn Waterfall, and Sambour, as well as 
the construction of an operating weir to control Tonle Sap Lake. 
　　　The 1956 ECAFE report further led to the detailed investigation in five locations: Pamon, 
Kemarath, Korn Waterfall, Sambour, and Tonle Sap. The report also suggested the creation of an 
executive agency to receive international, financial, and technological aid, and to coordinate with 
stake holders.
　　　In October 1957, four countries (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam) in the Mekong 
River Basin established the Committee for the Coordination of Investigation of the Lower Mekong 
Basin, simply known as the Mekong Committee. This was established to promote fundamental 
research into the development of the water system of the Mekong River in the lower areas. The 
National Mekong Committee was also established in each country to coordinate related domestic 
organs. The Mekong Committee, composed of the plenipotentiary representatives from the 
four member states, adopted a unanimous voting system in order to submit a unified demand 
to international institutions and foreign countries for technical and financial assistance. The 
secretariat of the Mekong Committee was established within ECAFE’s headquarters in Bangkok 
as the initial step. Then throughout the 1960s, the committee elaborated upon an integrated plan 
for the water resource development’s overarching flood control, irrigation, ship transportation, 
hydroelectric power generation, drainage, agriculture, fishery, and economic and social development 
in the lower areas of the Mekong River Basin. In this way, the committee became a venue in which 
each state and international organ could come together to create a unified development plan.
5. The 1958 UN Report, Japan’s Participation, and Kubota’s Contribution
　　　Japan’s initial attempt to commit to the development of the Mekong River Basin appeared 
as a part of its assistance to a UN-led reconnaissance geological survey. Between November to 
December, 1957, the United Nations Program of Technical Assistance, whose headquarters were 
located in New York, dispatched the Wheeler Investigation Team, which was named after captain 
13 ECAFE, Development of Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Basin. Flood Control Series, no.12, Bangkok, 
1957.
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Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler (who was retired from the US Army Corps of Engineers 
and the then technical adviser to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 
Yutaka Kubota, CEO of the Japanese engineering consulting firm Nippon Koei, assisted the team 
in carrying out their investigation alongside G. Duval (a French consulting engineer), John W. 
McCammon (a former general manager of the Québec Hydroelectric Committee and an advisory 
engineer in Canada), Kanwar Sain (the chairperson of the Central Water Resources Hydropower 
Committee of the Indian Government, and the technical director of the later Mekong Committee), 
and Tan Bao Tai (a Chinese technician)14. The UN-led mission completed a report titled Program of 
Studies and Investigations for the Comprehensive Development of the Lower Mekong Basin,  which 
was simply known as the “Wheeler Report” on January 23, 195815,16.
　　　The 1958 UN report recommended conducting a long list of researches including a 
hydrological survey by monitoring water levels and flow rates; an investigation into the economy, 
agriculture, and the underground natural resources in the Mekong Delta; and an overall estimation 
on the effects of the entire development by taking the improvements in irrigation, power supply, 
and ship transportation into consideration. Moreover, the report showed the approximate cost of 
conducting these studies. In fact, many of the engineers writing this report had also participated 
in the publishing of the abovementioned reports (Report on Technical Problems Relating to Flood 
Control and Water Resources Development of the Mekong: An International River and the ICA’s 
Reconnaissance Report on the Lower Mekong River Basin).  Hence, it might be safe to say that 
the UN report reflected the dialogue between the publishers of these two reports, namely, the US 
Department of Interior and ECAFE. In response to the recommendation for various researches by 
the 1958 UN report, ECAFE launched the “Mekong Project” between 1959–1964 in which the UN, 
France, the US, New Zealand, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Japan offered their assistance. 
　　　This is not to say that the Japanese government enthusiastically offered plenty of financial 
assistance from the beginning. It was not until Kubota approached several politically influential 
persons that a Japanese survey came into being. According to Akio Yoshimatsu, a river engineer 
who assisted Kubota in conducting the ECAFE and UN-led reconnaissance surveys, Kubota wanted 
to undertake an investigation regarding the tributaries, yet he ran short of funds (he needed at 
least USD 300,000 for the survey). Therefore, he requested the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
14 Footnote No. 28. Nguyen Thi Dieu, The Mekong River and the Struggle for Indochina: Water, War, and Peace  
(Washington DC: Praeger, 1999). p. 36. According to Nguyen Thi Dieu, the original Source he cites was ECAFE 
Annual Report 29/3/1957-15/3/1958 (New York: United Nations, 1958) p.17. 
15 United Nations, Program of Studies and Investigation for Comprehensive Development of Lower Mekong 
Basin, UN Survey Mission, Bangkok, 1958.
16 Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Science, Technology 
and American Diplomacy; the Mekong Project, Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism, Prepared for the 
Subcommittee on National Security and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US 
House of Representatives May 1972; Press and Information Office, Embassy of the Republic of Viet-Nam, News 
from Viet-Nam, Vol.1, Number 1, January 1961, p.204.
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Affairs (MOFA) to provide the funds, but MOFA rejected the demand. Kubota then turned to Prime 
Minister Nobusuke Kishi, as Kubota was personally aware of Kishi in Korea under the Japanese 
colonial rule before WWII. Ataru Kobayashi, the first president of the Development Bank of Japan, 
was a friend of Kubota who also persuaded the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aiichiro Fujiyama, and 
the Minister of Finance, Eisaku Sato. In total, the Japanese government allocated JPY 20 million 
to the Kubota investigation; half of which came from MOFA, and the other from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI)17. 
　　　Yet why was Kubota so engrossed in the business of the Mekong River Basin? It is said that he 
tried to do the same or similar during Imperial Japan’s heyday, but under different circumstances 
after the ending of WWII. Both before and during the war, Kubota was heavily involved in civil 
engineering, electrical/electronic engineering, and construction businesses that were consistent 
with the Imperial Japanese national policy. Kubota had worked at Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer 
Company Ltd., between 1924–1945 when Japan was defeated. In his thirties, he had gained plenty 
of experience as the head engineer in designing the detailed plan for constructing the Pujŏn-
kun hydroelectric power plant in colonial Korea. Moreover, in March 1943, Kubota conducted a 
feasibility study for power generation on the Island of Sumatra, Indonesia, where the Imperial 
Japanese Army were stationed. 
　　　From these experiences, Kubota nurtured a dream of cultivating the wildness in the Asian 
regions and initiated the concept of a comprehensive water resource development which would 
cover the production of electricity for industry, irrigation for agriculture, and flood control. 
According to Shimizu Tomihisa, Kubota wanted to contribute toward the rehabilitation of industry 
and the economy by transferring an idea and method from Nippon Koei’s comprehensive technology 
to Southeast Asia18. When the Japanese government proceeded with its reparations for the 
Japanese invasion and economic cooperation during the post-WWII era, Kubota sought the chance 
to tap into the Asian market, and the Mekong River Basin was his resultant business opportunity. 
　　　For the purpose of studying the major tributaries in the Mekong River over a three-
year period, the Japanese government organized the Mekong Gawa Tosatai,  or Mekong River 
Reconnaissance Corp. This reconnaissance party was a combined team led by Kubota and included 
technicians from different organizations such as Nippon Koei, the Power Development Corporation, 
Tokyo Electric Power Company, MOFA, MITI, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the 
Ministry of Construction. In January and February, 1959, the Japanese government sent a team 
of 15 technicians to undertake a land and air reconnaissance of the thirty-four tributaries in 
the Mekong River Basin. Allegedly, the team traveled 10,000 kilometers by airplane over a five-
day reconnaissance, and 7,000 kilometers by vehicle over a 20-day ground inspection in Laos, 
17 Yoshimatsu Akio and Koizumi Hajime, Mekong gawa ryuuiki no kaihatu, Sankaido, 1996: pp.26-27.
18 Shimizu Tomihisa, 1973, Kubota Yutaka – Nippon Koei Chosen – Vietnam, Shiso 14: pp.33-47.
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Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand19. As a result of their investigations, the team recommended a 
more detailed survey in the First Report of the Mekong River Tributary Examination Survey which 
was dedicated to the Mekong Project in the same year, and of which the specific date is unknown20.
　　　Following this Japanese endeavor, the Mekong Committee conducted follow-up research 
on four watersheds in the Mekong River Basin after receiving financial support from the United 
Nations Special Fund (that was later developed into the United Nations Development Program, 
or UNDP). The studies were respectively conducted in one tributary per country in the Mekong 
River Basin. As a result, four projects were selected. These were the Nam Guum Multipurpose 
Dam Development Project in Laos and its tributary in Nam Rik, the Battambang River Basin 
Development Plan in Cambodia, the Nam Pong Dam Development Plan in Thailand, and the 
Sessan River Upstream Development Plan in Vietnam. To elaborate upon the projects, fully-fledged 
investigations began in the countries in the Mekong River Basin.
6. Developments Between the Mekong River Reconnaissance Corp’s Final Report in 1961 and the 
Mekong Committee’s Indicative Basin Plan in 1970
　　　In 1961, the Japanese-funded Mekong River Reconnaissance Corp submitted a final report to 
ECAFE proposing a comprehensive development plan. While selecting 102 promising points in the 
thirty-four tributaries that Japan was assigned to work in and by demonstrating the development 
scheme for these points, the plan also recommended the construction of dams at 10 consecutive 
sites in the Mekong’s mainstreams (Pugven, Ruang Prabang, Sayaburi, Pamon, Bunkan, Takeku, 
Kemarath, Pakse, Stung Tren, and Sambour). 
　　　The Japanese plan suggested a development concept in which 10 million kilowatts of 
generating capacity was expected in only 10 of the consecutive dams in the mainstream, while 15 
million to 17 million kilowatts could be calculated in total when combined with the many tributary 
dams in the downstream areas of the Mekong. By assuming that electric power was a prerequisite 
for the growth of industry, the plan conceived of a grand scheme to promote irrigation and drainage 
with the construction of dams, and devised a strategy to improve agricultural productivity in 
Cambodia and in northeastern parts of Thailand.
　　　The plan also proposed the concept of constructing the Stung Treng High Dam. The newly 
built dam was supposed to submerge the entire Khone falls (Laos near the border with Cambodia) 
19 The Bangkok Post,  U Nyun, “A success from Two Angles”, November 28, 1964, p.12. In the article, the old 
photo and its explanation were attached. In the photo, Mr. Kurzuo Pamada (sic) stood in front of the Toyota’s 
van, with its body being put the sign of United Nations Mekong Investigation Team, Japan.”
20 Mekong Gawa Tosatai, Mekong gawa syuyou siryuu tosa dai ichiji houkokusho, 1959.
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which was a hard spot to pass. This implied that the successive construction of stepwise dams 
would make upstream cruising possible from the mouth of the Mekong River to the higher areas of 
Thailand and Myanmar. Further, the consecutive dams were supposed to enable vessels to travel 
downhill, which was considered useful for the local timber industries in the upstream areas. 
　　　It was, in fact, a Japanese engineer who came up with the concept of comprehensively 
developing the Mekong River Basin by establishing such multi-purpose dams to benefit industry, 
agriculture, forestry, and ship transportation. This was the crux of the integrated development 
concept that the Japanese team conceived of, and Kubota, as the leader of the Japanese team, 
expounded his views on the development concept of the River as follows21:
　　　There is a great necessity for what you call “multipurpose development” that could improve 
ship transportation, irrigate the flatlands on both banks, develop hydropower, and control 
floods in the Mekong River. Since it seems almost impossible to increase the water depth by 
dredging a long waterway in such a large river, you should instead think about adjusting the 
annual flow rate as much as possible and improving the water depth in a dry season to let the 
deep-draft ships pass through smoothly. For this purpose, let’s say [we can consider] detecting 
appropriate spots in the flow path, installing some weirs, submerging the shallows to increase 
the water depth, and discharging the adjusted water downstream in the drought seasons. At 
the dykes, we shall construct some hydropower stations as well as sluice gates to let vessels 
go upstream and downstream. Fortunately, because the average river gradient is moderate, 
even [average sized] dykes can store a large volume of water; the flow volume control and 
power generation are tremendously effective because the backwater can reach distant 
locations. In conjunction with the development of agriculture, forest industry, and mineral 
resources promoted by ship transport, we can make the best use of generated electric power 
for industrialization along with an easier supply of raw materials and delivery of products in 
the related areas.
　　　In parallel with the Japanese attempt to conduct a series of researches and show ECAFE 
their development concept, the Mekong Committee compiled its own development plan after 
receiving advice from ECAFE between 1964–1970. In 1970, the Committee finally released their 
Report on Indicative Basin Plan, or IBP 197022. This report drew a 30 year roadmap (from 1971 to 
2000) in which sequential dams were considered in 17 spots in the mainstream and in 87 spots in 
tributaries in accordance with short-term and long-term organized schedules. Nevertheless, many 
21 Kubota Yutaka, Tounan asia suiryoku kaihatsu kyouryoku no jittai, Asia mondai,  Novemver 1957: p.39.
22 Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, Report of Indicative Basin Plan,  
Bangkok, 1970.
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of these enumerated items in the IBP 1970 report owed their recommendations to the Mekong 
River Reconnaissance Corp as organized by the government of Japan23. After pointing out that the 
downstream areas adjacent to the Nam Gum Dam in Laos were decisively left untouched in the 
1960s, Hori argued that this was why it was possible to have such grandiose dreams of improving 
the situation from scratch in the Lower Mekong River24.
　　　However, the activities of the Mekong Committee became more and more stagnated due to 
the protracted conflict in Vietnam until 1975, the outbreak of the Cambodian Civil War in 1970, 
and Pol Pot’s brutal dictatorship. Therefore, the idea of the Mekong River Reconnaissance Corp of 
Japan, as adopted in the IBP 1970 report, was shelved until recently.
7. Japanese Commitment: The Case of the Prek Thnot Dam Project
　　　Although the Japanese plan for the total development of the Mekong River Basin was 
not fully realized, their recommendations were partially fulfilled. As we have already seen, the 
Mekong River Reconnaissance Corp recommended promising sites for the integration of the River 
Basin’s development in 1959. After four of these prospective sites were selected, studies began 
under the support of the United Nations Special Fund. Meanwhile, independently from the UN, 
the Japanese government also promoted it using technical cooperation for three projects in Prek 
Thnot (Cambodia), Nam Phueng (Thailand), and upstream Srepok (Vietnam). The concept of the 
development for these sites was originally recommended in the second report of the Mekong River 
Reconnaissance Corp in 1960. Taking the Prek Thnot Dam Project as an example, let us now turn 
to the way in which Japan deepened its own technical cooperation, and the extent to which such 
efforts were achieved.
　　　Figure 1 shows the Prek Thnot River catchment area. The Prek Thnot River is 232 kilometers 
long, and has a drainage area of 5,050 square kilometers. The headwaters are located in Kravang 
Mountain (1,177 meters high) in the western part of Phnom Penh. After flowing through a gorge in 
a mountainous area, the River gradually flows while meandering the plain areas with a gradient of 
1:2,500 meters to 1:3,000 meters. Having passed through Kampong Speu in the downstream area, 
the River flows toward Phnom Penh along the National Highway 4 (connecting Sihanoukville and 
Phnom Penh) and joins the Bassac River in the south of Phnom Penh. 
　　　The average annual rainfall between 1953–1973 was 1,312 millimeters according to the 
Phnom Penh Observatory. The annual average runoff between 1964–1969 in Anlong Touk (▲ and 
23 Mekong Reconnaissance Team Organized by Government of Japan, Comprehensive Reconnaissance Report 
on the Major Tributaries of the Lower Mekong Basin, Tokyo, 1961.
24 Hori, Mekong gawa: pp.129-134.
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■ point in Figure 1) was 39.4 cubic meters per second (with a maximum of 426 cubic meters per 
second and a minimum of 0.27 cubic meters per second). In 1991, land use in the basin consisted of 
forests (67.7%), paddy fields (20.6%), other agriculture (6.6%), and urban areas (0.2%)25.
　　　The Mekong River Reconnaissance Corp sated in the First Report of the Mekong River 
Tributary Examination Survey (1959) that it was necessary to study the Prek Thnot River to gain 
more detailed information, since the River included a vantage point to form a reservoir. Using a 
topographical map, the report also argued that building a dam and a reservoir would allow the 
storage of gigantic volumes of water in the catchment areas (equivalent to 5,000 square kilometers). 
In addition, the report asserted that a reservoir would enable a constant flow rate of 100 cubic 
meters per second throughout the year, which would be adequate for promoting irrigation, 
installing an electrical capacity around 40,000 kilowatts, controlling floods, and fertilizing parched 
lands in Tonle Bassac, even in a dry season. 
　　　Entrusted by the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, the afore-mentioned Nippon Koei 
conducted an intensive survey from October 1961 to May 1962, and published the Kingdom of 
Cambodia’s Prek Thnot River Development Preliminary Report  in December 1962 under the 
leadership of Kubota26. This report contained measurements for charting aerial photographs, a 
Figure 1. Prek Thnot River Catchment Area
Source: Takeuchi, Jayawardena, Takahashi (1995: 39)
25 Takeuchi Kuniyoshi, Jayawardena A. W and Takahashi Yutaka ed, Catalog of Rivers for Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific. Vol.Ⅰ-2-1, UNESCO and IHP Publication, 1995: pp.34-42.
26 Nihon seifu Prek Thnot gawa chousadan, Cambodia oukoku Prek Thnot gawa kaihatsu yobihoukokusho,  
Tokyo, 1962.
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geological study, an agricultural general survey, the installation and observation of rain gauges, 
and a collection of data concerning weather, hydrology, agriculture, livestock, electric power 
circumstances, and administrative issues.
　　　Following the survey, the report concluded that the Prek Thnot Project would be one of the 
most important projects in the Mekong sub-basin, as it was believed to meet the future demand 
of both electricity and water. The main facilities in the Prek Thnot Project were to be built in dry 
areas where farmers eagerly awaited irrigation, and in suburban areas of the capital, Phnom Penh, 
where electricity was in high demand. The Project was expected to start with power generation, 
although it placed the greatest importance on irrigation since the latter would take some time to 
launch. Nevertheless, according to the report, the Project was deemed to be profitable enough as 
the related facilities could be utilized for power generation in the first stage (for perhaps more than 
a decade) until the agricultural waterways were fully installed.
8. Official Inauguration of the Prek Thnot Project
　　　The Prek Thnot Project featured the construction of a series of multipurpose dams that aimed 
at irrigation, power generation, and flood control near the confluence of the Prek Thnot River and 
the Stan Ton River. Following an overall preliminary survey by the Japanese team between 1959–
1962, Israel conducted an agricultural irrigation survey between 1962–1965, and Australia created 
a plan for preparing the construction of a dam to generate power between 1964–1965. In 1966, 
Australia, Cambodia, Israel, Japan, and the Mekong Committee met to compare notes about the 
possible Project, thereby completing the Prek Thnot Cambodia First Stage (18,000 kW Power and 
18,500 ha Irrigation) Pre-Construction Report27. 
　　　In the report, the masterplan recommended the construction of five small-sized dams with the 
embankment connecting some hills with the main dam, with a height of 28.5 meters, and which 
would cross the mainstream of the Prek Thnot River. The estimated high-water discharge of the 
dams was 4,400 cubic meters per second. The effective reservoir volume was expected to be 980 
million cubic meters upon completion of the construction. The masterplan also recommended the 
installment of 18,000 kilowatts of power plants (9,000 kilowatts x 2 units), and facilities for 5,000 
hectares of irrigation (diversion weir, adjustment weir, waterways) for the time being28.
　　　In September 1968, the International Conference on the Electrical Irrigation Project was held 
27 Technical Working Party (Australia, Cambodia, Israel, Japan and the Mekong Committee Secretariat), Prek 
Thnot Cambodia First Stage (18,000kW Power and 18,500ha Irrigation) Pre-Construction Report, Phnom Penh, 
1966.
28 Arai Tsutomu, “Prek Thnot Dam Kensetsu kouji”, Kensetsu no Kikaika vol. 239, 1970: pp.44-47.
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in Cambodia under the auspices of the ECAFE, and the Mekong Committee, Japan, UK, Australia, 
Canada, Italy, India, Netherlands, West Germany, the Philippines, and Pakistan agreed to join the 
Prek Thnot Project under the newly established cooperative framework30. 
　　　The Prek Thnot Project was officially launched when the Agreement on Administrative 
Arrangements for the Prek Thnot (Cambodia) Power and Irrigation Development Project was 
signed at the UN’s headquarters in New York on November 13, 1968. By this Agreement, the 
Cambodian government became responsible for carrying out the construction works, while the 
Societe Nationale des Grands Barrages,  or National Society of Large Dams (the national agency 
for the dam construction), undertook the supervision, and the National Bank of Cambodia was 
assigned to manage a fund. The project assumed USD 19,245,900 of gratis funding aid and loans 
for the Prek Thnot Project. As the largest donor country, Japan pledged a loan of USD 4,215,000 
and a grant-in-aid of USD 4,215,000. 
　　　The breakdown in the rest of the expenditure was as follows: Australia offered to provide 
Figure 2. The Prek Thnot Dam Plan
Source: Kouji Kanzaki29.
29 Kanzaki Kouji, Prek Thnot Dam is Necessary to Prevent Flooding, 26/March/2017.
30 Kaigai gizyutu kyouryoku jigyoudan kaihatsu chousabu, Mekong gawa shiryu kaihatsu keikaku,  Tokyo, 
1968.
－ 66 －
technical services of USD 2,075,000 by the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority; Canada 
offered a grant-in-aid of USD 2,000,000; West Germany promised a loan of USD 1 million at an 
interest rate of 3% per year for 25 years; the UK pledged a loan of USD 1 million with no interest 
rate for 20–25 years; France offered a 20-year loan of USD 1 million with a 3.5% interest rate; 
Italy pledged an 18-year loan of USD 1 million with a 3% interest rate; the Netherlands offered 
to provide a grant of USD 1 million; the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) pledged a 
grant of USD 810,900; Denmark offered to provide a grant of USD 500,000; India offered to provide 
a grant and technical services of USD 200,000 in total; Pakistan offered to donate materials and 
services of USD 150,000; and the Philippines offered to donate USD 80,000 as a drawing cost. After 
the funding scheme was decided, international bidding commenced between January–May 196931. 
The joint venture of Japan’s Maeda Corporation and Tomen won the bid, and they began the 
construction in August 1969.
　　　Again, Japan was expected to become the largest donor as it pledged the largest funding 
amount. This stands to reason because the Cambodia–US relationship had become strained by 
the anti-US attitude of the Cambodian ruling monarch, Norodom Sihanouk, by the time of the 
Prek Thnot international agreement. Since the US-backed south Vietnamese military operations 
caused damage in Cambodian villages from time to time, Sihanouk treated everything the US 
did with suspicion, while the US regarded him as an unfavorable pro-communism neutralist. The 
Cambodian–US diplomatic ties were cut in May 1965 and reestablished in July 1969. Nevertheless, 
even during that four-year period, the US still thought that regional stability was essential for 
them to conduct battles on neighboring Vietnam’s soil, and is the reason why they pushed the 
Japanese government to take the lead in the Prek Thnot Project32.
9. Moving Forward During Cambodia’s Civil Strife
　　　Six months after the construction work started, Sihanouk was suddenly expelled by General 
Lon Nol’s coup d’etat,  which was backed by the US as Sihanouk visited Beijing on March 18, 1970. 
As mentioned above, Sihanouk was believed to be a pro-communism neutralist by the US. Unable 
to go back to his country, Sihanouk called for the Cambodian people to rise up in rebellion against 
Lon Nol’s regime, during which the Kingdom of Cambodia was renamed as the Khmer Republic. 
Following some sporadic riots in rural areas, north Vietnam suddenly invaded the Cambodian 
31 Yokota Tomoaki, “Prek Thnot Dam keikaku; Cambodia ni taisuru tasuukoku enjoyo”, Suirikagaku vol. 13(6), 
1970: pp.115-128. And Sato Syunichi, Prek Thnot Dam (Cambodia) ni taisuru wagakuni no enjoy, Tokinohourei 
vol.693: pp.37-40.
32 The diplomacy between the US and Japan over the Prek Thnot project will be discussed in the different 
article that the authors are preparing.
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territories as requested by the Cambodian communists. The lands occupied by the Vietnamese 
communist troops were soon handed over to the Cambodian communist insurgents, which led to 
the development of what was termed the Khmer Rouge, resulting in the Civil War. 
　　　On June 21, 1970, a large-scale battle broke out near Kampong, halting the construction 
work. The sixty Japanese engineers could not help but to return to Japan. However, the next 
month saw eight remaining Japanese engineers resuming the construction. Nonetheless, in a 
turbulent environment, the remaining engineers were forced to concentrate on the construction of 
downstream branch dams, the maintenance of machines and facilities for the construction, and the 
procurement of management for the construction materials to be shipped from foreign countries. 
The Lon Nol government concurrently petitioned Japan and France to continue the works of 
installing permanent plants such as hydraulic turbines, generators, gates, and channels. Since the 
Prek Thnot Project was an internationally approved enterprise, its continuation seemed to help in 
proving the legitimacy of Lon Nol’s government. Yoshio Meguro, a former officer of public relations 
at Maeda Corporation, also surmised that the Lon Nol regime intended to impress the people inside 
and outside of Cambodia in regard to its steady progress of the internationally approved Prek 
Thnot Project, despite the insurgencies33. 
　　　The engineers had to commute to the construction site from Phnom Penh by car every day. 
Skirmishes and artillery bombardment broke out sporadically along their route. Such extremely 
anomalous and inefficient conditions lasted until September 25, 1971, when the engineering works 
stopped again due to a bombardment against the storehouse containing the heavy machinery at the 
dam’s construction site. In November of the same year, the engineers decided to bring the damaged 
equipment back to Phnom Penh for repair. In February 1972, the engineers managed to resume the 
construction of the division weir (Figure 3). 
　　　Notwithstanding the Lon Nol regime’s insistence on construction, the Prek Thnot Project 
was indefinitely suspended soon after the completion of the diversion weir in May 1973. In the 
summer of the same year, a part of the newly-constructed weir was destroyed by the Khmer 
Rouge communist armed insurgents. When Sihanouk ruled Cambodia, his government signed the 
international agreement on the Prek Thnot Project. However, Sihanouk himself was very hesitant 
about the Project, since he always sensed that the US agents had formed conspiracies against 
his government. As such, Sihanouk only reluctantly gave them the green light for the Prek Thnot 
Project to begin when the US decided not to join and left most of the related business to Japan; 
it was actually his aides and ministers who sincerely promoted the Project before Sihanouk was 
game. Now that the Khmer Rouge became Sihanouk’s ally, they began attacking the Project.
　　　On September 12, 1973, Arthur F. Ewing, the resident representative of the UN for the 
33 Meguro Yoshio, “Cambodia ni Prek Thnot Dam wo tsukurihajimete” Dobokugakkaishi  vol. 57(11), 1972: 
pp.69-72.
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program of the development in the Khmer Republic, and coordinator of foreign aid for energy 
management and irrigation at the Prek Thnot dam, sent a written declaration to the Ministry of 
Information of the Lon Nol government34. According to Ewing, “the diversion dam completed at 
the beginning of this year [1973], as well as the surrounding sites, were attacked from August 19 
to August 23,” and the construction site was attacked from August 28–30, while “construction 
equipment of significant value was destroyed or damaged, causing a total suspension of activities at 
the principle site.” Ewing continued that “there is no, and has never been, any CIA agent,” or “any 
personnel at the site, since the United States Government does not contribute to the project.” Kouji 
Kanzaki, who joined the Prek Thnot Project as an engineer for Maeda Corporation, argued that 
the France and Japan-made materials for the construction works were to be left unattended upon 
delivery to the warehouse.
Figure 3. Construction of the Prek Thnot Project Between 1971–1973 
Source: Kouji Kanzaki (dates unknown).
34 Embassy of the Khmer Republic (Washington D.C.), Khmer News, Number 3, October 3, 1973, pp.14-15.
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10. Epilogue: Historical Implications of the Cambodian Prek Thnot Project
　　　Kanzaki entered Cambodia again in 1987 to check the status of the equipment and materials 
to see if the resumption of the construction works was still feasible, and he voluntarily tried to 
conduct the necessary maintenance works himself. Nippon Koei also conducted an environmental 
assessment for the possible resumption of construction in 1994. As such, there surely existed some 
momentum to restart the project. However, although more than 25 years have passed since then, 
such embryonic movements have not led to the revival of the Prek Thnot Project as of January 
2020. 
　　　However, perhaps the revitalization of the Prek Thnot Project requires us to reconsider the 
drastic transformation of the Cambodian society and industry over half a century. If the Prek Thnot 
Project was to be relaunched today, it would be necessary to take the relocation of 1,633 households 
into consideration35. The local newspaper, the Phnom Penh Post,  reported that in Dangkor district, 
around 40 families illegally occupied the riverbank area of Prek Thnot and were concerned about 
their losses, with some claiming to have lived in the area for years36. Whether they are legal or 
Figure 4. Current condition at the Prek Thnot Dam Site
Source: Author (Date: March 26, 2017).
35 Kanzaki Kouji, Prek Thnot Dam is Necessary to Prevent Flooding.
36 The Phnom Penh Post October 25, 2018, “Homes in Phnom Penh to be torn down” https://www.
phnompenhpost.com/national/homes-phnom-penh-be-torn-down (January 31, 2020)
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not, the Cambodian government needs to provide compensation for the residents who did not live 
around the assumedly drowned lowlands in the 1970s. On the other hand, the highlands (which 
cannot be submerged, even if the Prek Thnot Project was relaunched) have been transformed into 
centralized plantations to grow sugar cane, and requires plenty of laborers. 
　　　Meanwhile, it seems to the authors that the emerging factors give rise to a new necessity 
of the development of the Prek Thnot River catchment area to Cambodia. First, the spread of 
the physical distribution bases in the suburban areas of Phnom Penh, especially along National 
Highway 4, resulted from Cambodia’s recent and rapid economic growth, and has drastically 
increased the demand for industrial water and electricity. Second, the emerging threat of climate 
change endorses the importance of renewing the Prek Thnot Project. For instance, the Cambodian 
government needs to reconsider the protection of suburban areas of Phnom Penh from flooding, 
such as in Kampong Speu and Kandal Stueng in the Prek Thnot River catchment area. Third, as 
a result of the physical expansion of the so-called “metropolitan area” in Phnom Penh, Cambodia 
may have to seriously reconsider the comprehensive development plan of the Prek Thnot River 
Basin. 
　　　From the viewpoint of the comprehensive plan for disaster prevention in the metropolitan 
area and for urban planning, it may be significant to re-examine the experiences of the abortive 
Prek Thnot Project. In the age of global warming, the ways in which to make Phnom Penh robust 
and resilient remain to be seen. More scientific data, the modeling of recent weather conditions, 
the transformation of social and industrial structure, and the knowledge and experiences gained 
through old endeavors should be integrated.
　　　In this article, the authors reviewed the evolution of the development plan of the Mekong 
River Basin and the Japanese engineers’ contribution. The Prek Thnot River is a tributary that 
flows into the Mekong River as an international river. Thus, its development plan could be linked 
to the development concept of the whole Mekong River Basin. It is safe to conclude that the 
development concept of the Mekong River Basin, which both the Mekong River Reconnaissance 
Corp of Japan and the IBP 1970 entertained, took a holistic approach in that it attached the 
greatest importance to establishing the connection between the mainstream and its tributaries. 
Yoshihiro Kaida, who worked at the Mekong Committee between October 1974 and October 1977, 
looked back on the situation at the time as follows37:
　　　Not so many projects could be completed at once; there were numerous preliminary works 
that we had to do. For example, we collected and analyzed weather and hydrological data, 
designed a plan for power, flood prevention, irrigation, and the salt damage problem of the 
37 The interview with Yoshihiro Kaida in Kyoto University (December 8, 2017).
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Mekong Delta ... for constructing dams in the areas northeast of Thailand, or for planning 
income security. Besides, in collaboration with the Institute for Water Utilities of France, 
we simulated the Cambodian macro water environment to calculate the influence on rice 
cultivation through the development of the PaMong Dam in Laos [that the US seriously 
considered building, but to no avail]. Meanwhile, I rather considered the construction of the 
mainstream dam in Cambodia [as a preferable choice], although I understood that the Laos 
PaMong Dam was potentially important ... Cambodia could increase its production of 200,000 
to 400,000 tons of rice. Yet the problem was that there were no counterparts in Cambodia 
to discuss this with. Nevertheless, both the engineers and the secretariat at the Mekong 
Committee made an all-out effort [for the Cambodian future dam].
　　　Likewise, the workers and engineers in the construction sites for the Prek Thnot Project 
also exhibited the similar or same enthusiasm as shown in Kaida’s remarks. Even during the 
Cambodian Civil War, part of the Prek Thnot construction work continued—some of which was 
completed by engineers and local constructers. As one observer argued, once the international 
project physically began, the related works were naturally localized. Further, around the site, 
border-free, person-to-person networks formed which connected geologists, technicians, and civil 
engineers. In fact, Kanzaki has kept in contact with some previous construction workers. After he 
retired from Maeda Corporation, Kanzaki founded his own consulting company in Phnom Penh 
after utilizing personal connections established during the Prek Thnot Project. If such personalized 
local networks remained elsewhere, this may be a great asset to determine the Cambodian 
government to consider a new version of water resource development in the Prek Thnot River. 
　　　In June 2019, the UNDP released a new report that provided the foundation for better flood 
management in Cambodia’s Prek Thnot River Basin. Although the report did not suggest the 
revival of the Prek Thnot Project at all, it concluded that the “current capacity for drainage and 
flood management in the basin is insufficient,” and that the “cooperation between different relevant 
stakeholders remains limited.” Regardless of whether Cambodia hopes to resume the project, it 
may be worthwhile to review the historical experience, knowledge, and human networks formed 
through the Prek Thnot Project by perusing the past investigation reports from the engineering 
viewpoints, as well as by hearing the stories from past technicians and engineers. This examination 
may be of great help to Cambodia and/or the international organ involved in the business of the 
Mekong River Basin, and may help to bring the Japanese civil engineers’ unfinished business to 
completion.
